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We analyse a micro-panel data set to investigate the effect of regional institutional 
environment and economic factors on Russian new firm entry rates across time, 
industries and regions. The paper builds on novel databases and exploits inter-regional 
variation in a large number of institutional variables. We find entry rates across 
industries in Russia are not especially low by international standards and are correlated 
with entry rates in developed market economies, as well as with institutional 
environment and firm size. Furthermore, industries that, for scale or technological 
reasons, are characterised by higher entry rates experience lower entry within regions 
affected subject to political change. A higher level of democracy enhances entry rates for 
small sized firms but reduces them for medium or large ones.  
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The process of entry of new firms is an important element in the dynamics of market 
economies, Caves (1998), Bertelsman, Hattiwanger, and Scarpetta (2004). As a crucial 
aspect of the “creative destruction” process, new firm entry helps to transfer resources 
from low to high productivity activities and underlies competitive pressures 
dissipating monopoly rents, Bartelsman, Scarpetta, and Schivardi (2003). From the 
entrepreneurial perspective, new firm entry may also be the source of innovative 
processes and products as well as being a key mechanism in their dissemination, 
Audretsch and Acs (1991). These factors are significant in both developed and 
developing economies, where new firm entry may also play a central role in narrowing 
the gap to the technological frontier, Hausman and Rodrik (2003). Entry of new firms 
is not uniformly beneficial however; Chamberlain’s (1956) model of monopolistic 
competition highlighted the welfare consequences of excessive entry generating excess 
productive capacity. In imperfect market structures the dangers of insufficient new 
firm entry seem likely to be more significant than those of excessive entry because the 
strategic interest of incumbents is to restrict entry. This argument is strengthened in 
developing economies where there are too few enterprises, Tybout (2000), and entry 
barriers may be even higher because the weakness of institutions may enhance the 
market power of incumbents, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2002), with harmful implications for welfare, Benerjee and Ghatak (2005).  
 
Previous studies, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002), Klapper, 
Laeven, and Rajan (2006), have analysed cross country heterogeneity in entry rates 
and hypothesised a link with the domestic institutional context. These studies, 
however, could only partially control for macroeconomic policy differences, trading 
regimes and numerous other country specific factors. To address this problem, we 
analyse the impact of institutional quality on the rate of entry in a single emerging 
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market; that of Russia. By investigating firm entry on a regional level, we control for 
the impact of macroeconomic policies and we exploit the regional fragmentation and 
internal institutional variation of a huge economy to address the problem of omitted 
variables, Shleifer and Treisman (2005). Our paper therefore contributes to the 
debate about the impact of institutions on new firm entry by cross-regional cross-
industrial entry rates within a single economy. We concentrate on regional economic 
heterogeneity thereby building on Berkowitz and DeJong (2005a) who show that 
Russian regional entrepreneurial activity is significantly associated with subsequent 
growth. 
 
The Russian context provides a natural quasi-experiment in addressing the question 
of how institutions influence new firm entry. This is because Russia followed a 
regionally differentiated process of transition to a market economy after the demise of 
the Soviet Union in 1991. In some regions, market oriented reforms were introduced 
and implemented rapidly, in others more slowly, and in some hardly at all. We have 
constructed a data set which charts political and institutional change over time, and 
we seek to relate developments in firm entry rates by industry and region to prior 
political changes associated with the timing of elections and the character of the 
results. In so doing, we build on ideas of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) that links 
security of property rights to democracy. 
 
Russia is a federation of states and sub-units and, whilst much of the formal 
regulatory and institutional framework is common across all regions, control over 
significant aspects is decentralised. The constitution gives the central government 
exclusive authority in regulation of foreign trade, legal framework of a single market 
as well as over financial, currency and customs regulations, OECD (2002). However, 
there remains great diversity between Russian regions in most other aspects of the 
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institutional and political environment and this allows us to explore the impact of 
institutional variation on entry rates in a novel way.  
 
We build on recent developments in the literature in analysing of inter-regional 
entry barriers and institutional variation, addressing the issue of economic barriers to 
entry by exploiting the concept of ''natural entry rates'', Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan 
(2006). We use the rate of entry by industry in advanced Western countries as a proxy 
for the "natural" entry propensity in each region, reflecting inherent technological 
barriers in that industry caused, for example, by economies of scale or organisational 
efficiencies gained by incumbents from their experience. We are assuming that the rank 
ordering of entry in developed economies corresponds to the rank ordering of natural 
barriers across industries. We undertake our empirical work by combining three major 
data sources; a huge new comprehensive longitudinal enterprise data set, ORBIS (BvD 
Copyright), combined with two new sources of information concerning institutions at the 
regional level. The first concerns political stability and turnover in the regions and has 
been collected from primary sources in Russia for this study and the second  includes 
both data on regional political and economic openness, McFaul, Petrov, and Ryabov 
(2004).  
The ORBIS dataset is sufficiently comprehensive to allow us to measure entry at 
the date of incorporation of the firm, rather than the more common but less satisfactory 
proxy of the date when the firm enters the dataset afresh, Dunne, Roberts, and 
Samuelson (1989). It also includes the smallest firms, while most studies of entry focus 
on firms employing more than 50 workers. Much entry takes place in firms with fewer 
than 50 workers, and these are likely to be particularly sensitive to variation in 
institutional quality, Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz (2008). However, since entry may 
also be in part a process of entrepreneurs learning about future profitability, Jovanovic 
(1982), inclusion of smaller firms also increases the noise and we therefore include 
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estimates which control for firm size1. We use difference in difference methods to 
explain inter-regional entry rates in terms of natural entry rates and institutional 
variation by region.  
We find that entry rates in Russia are not especially low on average, despite 
deficiencies in the formal institutional environment. Even so, our results provide 
evidence that regional variation in institutional quality impacts on entry rates relative 
to the levels that would pertain in Western economies. However, In particular, political 
uncertainty has a disproportionately large negative effect on entry rates in industries in 
which the barriers to entry are lower. Thus, if we consider regions across Russia, 
industries that are characterised by higher entry rates in Western economies experience 
lower entry in regions with greater political discontinuity. Higher levels of democracy 
are found to increase entry rates but only for small sized firms. In fact, greater reliance 
on democratic institutions is found to reduce entry rates for medium and large firms 
across Russian regions.  
 
The paper is organised as follows: in the second section, we briefly review the 
literature on entry and institutions; in the third section, the data set is described and the 
rate of entry is reported across regions, industry and time; section four is dedicated to 
the empirical strategy and section five to regression results; we draw our main 
conclusions in section six. 
 
2. LITERATURE  
 
The literature on economic development has recently begun to recognise the 
importance of institutions. There is a growing theoretical and empirical body of work 
investigating the role of institutions in explaining differences in cross-country 
                                                 
1 The dynamic of firm growth might well be size dependent, see Jovanovic (1982), and therefore 
this might lead to different size-varying natural entry rates. This will be taken into account in the 
estimation strategy of section four. 
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economic growth. There are at least two areas in which this literature could usefully 
be extended.  The first is primarily empirical; there are a large number of institutions 
that can potentially affect growth but these are often difficult to measure; may rely on 
subjective valuations; and can suffer from endogeneity and multicollinearity. Second, 
it is hard to isolate the country specific effects from institutional ones. 
 
A common approach to conceptualising institutions emphasizes technical barriers and 
market supporting institutions, such as availability of credit (narrow institutions) as 
an important factor influencing economic growth. Increasingly, however, an 
understanding is emerging that broader governance institutions affect interactions 
across a series of business, social and political activities and influence economic 
growth, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). The view that governance institutions are 
important for growth has been accepted by international organisations such as the 
World Bank, IMF and the UN. Indeed, they sometimes provide loans conditional on 
the introduction of ‘good governance’ institutions. These institutions can take 
different form and are aimed at two outcomes – increasing the transparency of 
decision making and input into policy-making from the general population. These 
institutions are increasingly seen as important for promoting economic growth. 
 
The literature on new firm entry usually starts from the notion of barriers to entry; a 
cost for a new entrant which is not borne by the incumbent, Bain (1968), Stigler 
(1968), and which therefore generates rents for incumbents, Gilbert (1989). The main 
barriers to entry are often identified empirically to include economies of scale, 
learning curve advantages, product differentiation and the absolute cost advantages 
of established firms. A considerable literature has emerged to analyse these 
phenomena in a strategic and multi-firm setting, e.g. Dixit (1979), Dixit (1981), 
Aghion and Bolton (1987), Gilbert and Vives (1986), Carlton (2004). The models have 
also been widely tested on developed economy data, e.g. Orr (1974), Dunne, Roberts, 
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and Samuelson (1989), Geroski (1991), Caves (1998) on the basis of equations linking 
entry rates to measures of, for example, scale economies, sunk costs, market structure 
and a variety of additional variables. 
 
Decisions by entrepreneurs to enter a market can be viewed as depending on 
estimated future profits from the venture and secure access to these profits, or the 
likelihood to lose them, Casson (2005). The industrial organization literature suggests 
future profits depend on the industry into which the entrepreneur enters, including 
its technological characteristics, market structure and the strategic interactions of the 
incumbents. The quality of institutions affects both the return and the riskiness of 
investment, including the possibility of expropriation via corruption or political 
turmoil, Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004). Thus, the character of institutional 
arrangements affects the costs of setting up and running a business, as well as the 
likelihood of profits being expropriated by other actors. While, institutional variation 
in developed economies with respect to factors influencing entry is limited, 
heterogeneity can be much greater in emerging markets. These are often captured by 
formal indicators of institutional quality. Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2002) have established that there is considerable variation in the regulations 
governing new firm entry and these are correlated with both entry rates and with 
corruption. Thus Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002)  report 
data on regulations of entry (start-ups) in 85 countries and find that there is a 
positive relationship between the size of informal economy (in turn highly correlated 
with corruption), and the burden of the entry regulations, measured by the number of 
procedures, time and cost of starting a firm. 
 
But informal factors are also important, though harder to measure. De Soto's (1990) 
analysis of entry in developing countries stresses the inter-relationship between 
formal and informal barriers, with higher formal levels of regulation implying greater 
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corruption and informal barriers as well. Tybout (2000) points out that in less 
developed countries, the cost of entry varies with firm size and prevalence of shadow 
economy in a specific sector. In such countries, antitrust enforcement is often weak 
because large firms lobby legislative bodies to restrain the entry of new firms, and to 
strengthen the incumbents' power. The judicial system underlying formal institutions 
is not working in a vacuum. Formal business licensing and labour law constraints can 
be buttressed by informal processes such as embedded social norms and informal 
institutions (networks, shared business practices, etc.); informal networks can also 
offset to some extent the problems generated by weaknesses in the formal 
environment, Estrin and Prevezer (2010). Weak legal and institutional environments 
raise the cost of doing business, for example the costs of enforcing contracts, and are 
often associated with higher level of corruption, Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, and 
Zoido-Lobaton (2000). Importantly, these additional costs have the characteristic of 
entry barriers, bearing more heavily on entrants than incumbents who have 
developed expertise in operating in this environment. Hence the literature suggests 
that poor institutional environments are likely to enhance the advantages to 
incumbents yielded by higher levels of regulation. 
 
The empirical evidence is limited but supports the view that formal barriers have a 
negative effect on entry. One of the most important papers is by Klapper, Laeven, and 
Rajan (2006) who by exploiting a difference in difference approach find that 
regulations hinder entry, notably for those which are in naturally "high entry" 
industries. Labour regulations reduce entry into labour intensive sectors but property 
rights protection increases entry into R&D intensive sectors, Bertrand and Kramarz 
(2002). Ciccone and Papaionnaou (2007) find that entry rates are higher when the 
time for registering new business is lower although this is also influenced by demand 
and technology factors. However, in these studies the measures of institutional 
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heterogeneity are limited to one or a few variables in each country, for example 
regulatory barriers, and these may be correlated with other country-specific factors, 
for example macroeconomic policies, exchange rate factors ,and tariffs associated with 
inter-sectoral rates of entry. 
 
Our empirical work focuses on the impact of institutional variation and political 
discontinuity on regional entry rates in Russia. Russia is a particularly promising 
country in which to explore this phenomenon. The country has a strong common 
history and identity. Moreover, the indicators of formal institutional quality are fairly 
good. According to the 'Doing Business' statistics compiled by the World Bank, Russia 
registers a high number of procedures to be implemented in order to open a new 
business (especially for screening), but does not impose high barriers in terms of 
registration's time and cost. For example advanced Western countries such as Austria 
and Italy impose significantly higher entry barriers in terms of registration's time and 
fees. However, the same country scores relatively highly in corruption levels as well 
as the prevalence of informal economy2. The discrepancy between relatively low 
formal regulations cost and high corruption index can be explained by the high impact 
of informal institutions. As argued by Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz (2008), some 
transition countries, such as Russia, are characterised de facto by a complex system of 
entry barriers or entry fostering mechanisms. 
 
However, the significant point for our study is that, while Russia is a single country 
with a unified exchange rate and macro-economic policy regime, regional barriers 
created by local administrative practices controlled by governors have resulted in 
fragmentation into regional markets and local market potential at the regional level 
is an important factor influencing the decision for firms to enter, Berkowitz and 
DeJong (2005a). Second, as regional governors have a large sway over local legislation 
                                                 
2 E.g. Index of Economic Freedom, Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal Index. 
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as well as informal influence over local state bodies, Popov (2001), OECD (2002), there 
are potentially significant differences in institutional settings across Russia. Finally, 
the state and local groups can behave in a predatory manner, Frye and Shleifer 
(1997), CEFIR (2007), and thus expropriate or diminish generated profits within their 
region. Therefore, Russian regions provide a useful laboratory for research on 
potential institutional factors affecting entry rates. The large number of regions and 
the heterogeneity in their economic and institutional environments, Popov (2001), 
allows us to disentangle various institutional factors and measure their effects on 
entry rates. The diversity of economic conditions and the large scope for regional 
governments to influence local institutions have resulted in significant divergence of 
regional development paths. This suggests inter-regional differences in both formal 
and informal institutions might have a significant effect on regional entry rates in 
Russia, relative to those "natural" rates of entry that one might observe in developed 
economies. We explore this hypothesis empirically in the remainder of this paper. 
 
3. MEASURES OF ENTRY AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY 
 
 
The data used in this paper are drawn from ORBIS database and consist of firm level 
balance-sheet information spanning from 1996 to 2008. These data cover the bulk of 
registered firms down to four digit industries  in Russia and  provide information on 
shareholders, company's finances, employment count, location, legal status (e.g. 
limited liability companies, single proprietorship, etc.), year of incorporation3, and 
company name. The database closely matches information provided by Amadeus (BvD 
copyright) and this allows us to compare the Russian entry rates we compute with 
statistics provided by other studies, e.g. Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006) that use 
the same definitions, methodology and variables. However, unlike Amadeus, ORBIS 
does not have any firm size restrictions; smaller firms are therefore included in the 
                                                 
3 Information is also provided on the month and day of incorporation, but these are not exploited. 
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data set and new firm entry tends to be concentrated in this size category. 
 
We follow the literature, Geroski (1995), Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006), in using 
up to two measures of the entry rate into an industry; annual entry and entry 
spanning a two year period. We base our measure of entry on the year in which the 
firm is registered as being incorporated, rather than the more commonly used 
indicator of the year that the firm first enters the relevant database. This improves 
the quality of the measure considerably in environments, such as Russia, where 
reporting standards by firm are not always uniformly applied, so one cannot be sure if 
a newly reporting firm is in fact an entrant or an enterprise that failed to report 
consistently in previous years. Thus, Entry 1-year is the number of companies in an 
industry and region with incorporation year = T divided by the number of companies 
with the incorporation year ≤ T. Entry 2-year is the number of companies in an 
industry and region with incorporation year = T or (T – 1) divided by the number of 
companies with the incorporation year ≤ T4. Industries are denoted by the subscript 'i' 
on 62 Nace 2 digit dummies (excluding such sectors as agriculture, mining, utility, 
financial intermediation and public administration); regions are denoted by r, i.e. 88 
regions dummies (Chechnya is dropped from the data); time is denoted by t, for the 
years 1996-20085. One of the advantages of ORBIS compared with the Amadeus 
dataset used by Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006), is that it contains every 
registered firm, rather than all firms above a certain size. As noted above, this is 
potentially a great advantage in the analysis of entry, because entrants are typically 
                                                 
4 For brevity all the reported results refer to the 1-year entry rate, but the results hold with the 2-
year entry measure (available on request). 
5 There is a danger that incorporation in the early years of the transition might indicate 
privatisation rather than new firm entry. However, in fact the bulk of the Russian economy was 
privatized by 1997 and such instances are rare in our database. We also cannot distinguish 
between new entry and legal change of name, which may have occurred in later years. The legal 
change of name, however, is often a result of change of ownership and thus represents a new way 
of recombining a firm's resources and introduction of a new strategy. While this does not 
constitute a de novo entry as such, it still often signifies entry of a new owner or a new approach 
to the market. Our data however may overstate entry rates because of this phenomenon. 
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much smaller than incumbents, Geroski (1995). However, it brings a potential 
drawback because our measure of entry is based on the date of incorporation since a 
significant number of small firms entering the regional market may be unregistered. 
We noted above that Russia scores poorly with respect to the scale of the informal 
economy. To address the resulting bias, we also estimated our econometric models on 
a four dimensional database (region, industry, year and firm-size6), which increases 
the size of the sample and captures the differential effect of institutions on entry-size 
categories. In this experiment, the dependent variable is defined in the following way: 
Entry 1-year is the number of companies with incorporation year = T of a specific size 
category divided by the number of companies with the incorporation year ≤ T of the 
same size category. We adopt a standard size taxonomy by employees, namely s1 < 50, 
s2 = [51-250], s3 > 2507. 
 
New firm entry rates in Russia as a whole do not appear to be particularly low by 
international standards8.  Thus we find that rate entry is registered in an interval 
between 11.9% and 2.4% throughout the 1996-2008 span compared with 7.09% in 
Europe and 6.65% in the USA using the same NACE industries in 1998/9, Dun and 
Bradstreet (2000). However, Russian rates are quite low for emerging markets as a 
whole, Estrin and Campos (2007). Moreover, the entry rates calculated using ORBIS 
are high compared with figures when using Amadeus, Aidis and Adachi (2007). This 
is partly because entry rates are higher for small firms, most of which are excluded 
from other datasets. In fact, annual average annual entry rates for large firms, 
                                                 
6 The theoretical overall number of data of the database is therefore 13 x 62 x 88 = 70928. 
However there are missing industries in some regions. Our dataset contains around 50000 
observations and over 100 000 when we account for the firm size effect. 
7 The overall sample exploits all the firms declaring the date of incorporation (see also footnote 
14). The size level database is build by splitting the overall firm sample in three parts according 
to their size category. Entry rates are computed within separate categories. Finally the three 
parts are pooled back together in a single size-level database. Some firms do report date of 
incorporation but not size and therefore are part of the all sample database. Only firms reporting 
date of incorporation and size are included in the size level data.  
8
 See tables A1.1 and A1.2 and graphs A1.1 and A1.2 from appendix 1. 
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employing more than 250 workers, are around 4.3% and tending to decline over time 
(6.7% in 1996 and 0.4% in 2008), while those for the smallest firms are around 11.3%. 
However, the issue is more complex than this because there is also more year to year 
variation in the small firm category. Moreover, high gross entry rates do not 
necessarily imply high net entry rates if survival rates are low, Brown and Earle 
(2006) and Rutkowski and Scarpetta (2005)9. 
 
The fragmented nature of political structures creates significant barriers to the 
creation of a unified market across Russia. As a result, Russian regions differ 
significantly, for example in their wealth, income levels, risk of social tensions and 
administrative barriers to start-ups, and therefore in the institutional environment 
with respect to entry. Thus, while several regions have been shown to have a 
legislative climate favourable to investors, such as Nizny Novgorod, Yaroslavl and 
Moscow, others, such as Kursk and Magadan, lag behind. The OECD (2002) report on 
trading policy in Russian regions illustrates the diversity of institutional setting. For 
example, Cheliabinsk oblast introduced additional procedures and higher fees than 
those stipulated by federal law for such activities as employment services, 
international tourism, passenger transportation as well as production and marketing 
of alcohol. Primorskiy krai decreed higher fees for licensing pharmaceuticals, while 
Nizhny Novgorod extended licensing requirements for engineering systems, building 
and road maintenance. The republics of Udmurtia and Mordovia introduced regional 
certification of companies, restricting entry. To explore the link between entry and 
institutional environment, we compile a dataset containing measures of institutional 
environment at the regional level, drawing on two further data sources. These are a 
newly constructed database on governor turnover in the Russian regions between 
                                                 
9 The corresponding values for the 2 years entry rate, show similar patterns between Europe and 
USA, whilst Russia entry rates are higher. This may be due to a post 1998 shake-out effect: the 
number of firms entering the market in the 1999 and 2000 year might have been abnormally high 
due to the rebound from the end of the crisis. 
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1995 and 200910 and the democratisation scores compiled by McFaul, Petrov, and 
Ryabov (2004). 
 
We are able to exploit regional variations in Russia because regional authorities have 
discretion in such areas of joint responsibility with the central government as 
ownership, land use and management, mineral resources, as well as some authority 
over taxes11. Moreover, regional authorities have formal power and responsibility 
over local financial aid and subsidies, government procurement, investment and trade 
promotion, control over natural resources, environment protection and licensing. 
Finally, local regional authorities have considerable discretionary powers, based on 
informal practices and the use of administrative resources. Consequently, they can 
exercise informal control over local market institutions which affect the ease of 
creating and operating a firm. For example, they control factory inspections. Thus, an 
average small company in Kurgan oblast in 2001 was inspected 10 times compared to 
2.5 times in Samara oblast over the same time period, CEFIR (2007). 
 
Local governors have great leverage in establishing the local "'rules of the game" for 
businesses. Although the ability of regional authorities to form local policies entirely 
independently of the central government waned after 2000, local informal practices 
and networks have preserved the diversity of local institutions that affect formation of 
new firms. A wide array of institutions can affect business environment and therefore 
entry, ranging from the quality of local judicial system, law enforcing organs, 
licensing practices, local inspectorates, the financial system and local bureaucracy, 
                                                 
10 We will only exploit the 1996-2008 interval for consistency with entry rates. 
11 In 2002 a new order of profit taxation was established in the Russian Federation by 
implementing a decrease of corporate profit tax rate from 35 to 24%. Tax revenues decreased from 
513,8 billion Roubles in 2001 to 463,3 billion Roubles in 2002. However, in 2004 profit tax 
revenues reached 867,6 billion Roubles, and their average annual increase in 2002-2004 was 
36,8%. Considering the revenues increase and that effective profit tax rate decreased from 25,1% 
in 2000 to 17,8% in 2003  it may be deduced that the tax revenues increase was influenced by the 
very rapid expansion of tax base, Krivka (2006). However, this was a national level reform and 
cannot be exploited in our analysis of inter-regional variation. 
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Lambert-Mogiliansky, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya (2007), CEFIR (2007), Brown, Earle, 
and Gehlbach (2009), Orrtung (2004). These, however, tend to be highly correlated, 
and difficult to operationalise. To circumvent this problem we measure the 
institutional environment by focusing on one of the crucial considerations for a new 
entrant – predictability of the political continuity and, as a consequence, of the 
business environment. 
 
We capture the periodic uncertainty that stems from the expiry of the current 
governor’s term in the office by measuring political discontinuity. This variable is of a 
particular salience to Russia as Russian governors tend to run their regions as 
“personal fiefdoms”, Treisman (2002), Ross (2003), and exert great influence over 
regional political and economic process. As emphasized by Orttung (2004: 58) “the 
governors’ enormous influence on regional budgets, licenses, electricity prices, and the 
overall conditions in which business operates means that any business seeking to 
function in the regions must take them into account”. Despite recent attempts at 
recentralisation, governors retained enormous influence over regional political and 
economic life, Konitzer and Wegren (2006). 
 
Furthermore, because both political and economic decisions are highly personalised, a 
change of governor and his team is likely to lead to significant changes in how 
business is done in the region. This will involve a change in ties to business groups, 
envisioned economic policies, investment programmes and, importantly, new informal 
rules of the game. Moreover, due to the weakness of formal institutions there is little 
continuity of policies. Since so many decisions and practices are based on personal ties 
and loyalties, personnel changes in the higher echelons of the local administration 
inevitably spell uncertainty in regard to future practices and policies. Therefore even 
the possibility of a change in governor is likely to create uncertainty over change in 
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local business practices.  
 
With these sets of indicators in mind we constructed a novel dataset measuring 
political discontinuity at the governor level. These indicators reflect the systemic 
uncertainty which affects regional businesses every four years as the gubernatorial 
term in the office expires and the incumbent faces the risk of being replaced by 
another candidate. It is assumed that fewer changes in governor, as well as a lower 
level of political conflict, contribute to a more stable investment environment, i.e. 
higher political continuity. With the same governor and political elite in office over a 
longer time period, entrepreneurs can build links with more stable and durable links 
with local politicians and use these as a basis for longer-term investment decisions. A 
new governor with a different political background might introduce his or her own 
group of associates, disrupting existing links and creating potential investment 
insecurity. To capture the level of uncertainty associated with potential change of 
governor, we constructed a governor turnover dataset by documenting instances when 
the incumbent governor’s term in the office expired (whether he or she stood for re-
election or re-appointment), instances of governor change (again, whether through 
elections or re-appointment) and the quality of these changes. The latter indicator 
reflects the likelihood of policy continuity after the possible change of governor and 
consequently, the degree of uncertainty faced by local businesses. The degree of 
uncertainty (called in the regressions “political discontinuity”) stemming from 
potential governor’s change was measured on a three point scale- i.e. [0,3] - for each 
year during the period 1996-2009. This was done to capture the gradation of 
uncertainty caused by different scenarios of potential power change. Thus, zero 
represents status quo, and was assigned to years when no election or governor 
appointment took place. Years when the current governor stood for re-election or re-
appointment, but where the incumbent remained in power were assigned a value of 1. 
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Instances, when the incumbent was replaced by a candidate from the same political 
elite were assigned a value of 2. Cases when the new governor came from the 
opposition were given the value of 3. 
 
By distinguishing between different scenarios in governor change we are able to 
capture the nuanced nature of uncertainty associated with potential political change 
at the governor level. In effect, the cumulative12 indicator measures the increasing 
degree of uncertainty faced by a prospective entrant in cases of:  
• no foreseeable change in governor and therefore stable economic and political 
policies; 
• a possible change in governor in which, the incumbent remained in office and 
therefore continuity of present policies; 
• a new governor coming to power, who, being part of the same political group, 
is likely to provide some elements of  continuity of previous policies but also 
possibly some change; 
• election of a new governor from an opposition party who is likely to 
discontinue current policies and practices.  
 
This categorisation in conjunction with other indicators allows us to distinguish 
between change per se and quality of change. By introducing this distinction we seek 
to separately measure the impact of institutional improvement (or deterioration) as 
well as to gauge the impact of change itself. 
 
Predictability can also stem from transparency of decisions taken by the governing 
elite. As argued by Mau and Yanovsky (2002), firms want to operate with an 
understandable, transparent and predictable system of decision–making, rather than 
                                                 
12 The cumulative indicator is constructed by adding 0,1,2 or 3 for each year in which there is a 
change in the political uncertainty environment. 
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being dependent on the whim of an individual. Democratic practices and political 
openness are thought to generate transparency and preclude rulers from acting 
unilaterally. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) posit that it is democratic institutions 
which give rulers the incentives to establish economic institutions conductive to 
growth. First, without the checks and balances that democracy provides, rulers are 
likely to establish economic institutions beneficial to a small group and detrimental to 
the remainder of society. Second, democracy vests power in a broad group of people, 
thus giving them an incentive to uphold secure property rights as they themselves 
benefit from this. Finally good economic institutions, identified as secure property 
rights, are more likely to develop when rulers can extract only limited rents from the 
society (ibid). This leads us to measure the transparency and openness of regional 
political processes in Russia as an alternative indicator of institutional quality that 
may affect new firm entry. 
 
This suggests that in Russia, where there is considerable regional variation, it is also 
important to consider the impact of democratic practices on entry rates in Russian 
regions. As suggested by theoretical literature, these can provide some institutional 
stability to offset uncertainty generated by political discontinuity. We measure 
institutional quality via the extent of media freedom, level of democracy and the 
extent of openness of regional political life. We aim to capture predictability of 
regional political and economic processes that stems from access to information and 
involvement in political life of the region. We gauge the equality of opportunities for 
all economic players by measuring the quality of economic openness in the region. 
This measure includes the extent of economic liberalisation and the degree of 
corruption.  
 
The set of indicators to measure the quality of democracy and therefore the 
predictability of regional institutions were sourced from an important new dataset 
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collected by McFaul, Petrov, and Ryabov (2004). The dataset includes 10 sub-
indicators, which together provide an assessment of political and economic openness 
in each region. In our estimations, we use both the summary variable for 
democratisation (composed out of all 10 sub-indicators), and the 10 sub-indicators 
separately, but for brevity we report the aggregate indicator only, the results being 
broadly consistent13. The sub-indicators give respectively an account of political 
factors (political openness, elections, pluralism, regional political structure), economic 
factors (economic liberalization, corruption), and civil-society and social factors 
(media, civil society, elites, local self-government). Together, they capture the 
openness of regional political and economic processes and indicate how easy it is for a 
new entrant to gauge future profits from the venture and estimate the likelihood of 
losing the investment.  
 
 
4. ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
 
In order to test the relationship between entry and institutions, we run a Tobit 
estimation model for the censored [0.1] entry variable computed from the year of 
incorporation declared by the firm14. We exploit the Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan 
(2006) methodology drawn from the difference in difference approach used by Rajan 
Zingales (1998).  The specification includes regional fixed effects - D r -, industry fixed 
effects (62 Nace 2-digit industries, excluding agriculture, mining, utility, financial 
intermediation and public administration that show a structurally lower entry rate) - 
D i -, time fixed effects - D t - (13 years). We also include the interaction term Entry 
EU [1998-2003] * INSTITUTION Region-Year(-1)  or Entry EU [1998-2003] * 
INSTITUTION Region-Year(-2). This specification is equivalent to testing whether 
                                                 
13 Tables available upon request. 




institutions differentially affect entry rates given the "natural entry rate"15, the 
latter reflecting the long run barriers to entry for the given industry in a developed 
market economy. 
 
The institutional variables are loaded, either as the governors’ turnovers indicators or 
the Petrov data and natural entry rates are sourced from EU 1998-2003 data16. 
Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt, and Prantl (2004) analyse entry determinants 
using both structural variables and exogenous variation via instrumental variable 
estimation in order to tackle potential reverse causality, namely that entry might 
improve institutions, could in principle occur in our specification if a sector-region 
specific entry rate affects the institutional environment of the region. However, we 
think this to be unlikely in our data because the dependent variable varies across 
regions, time and industry, whereas the potentially endogenous regressor is at the 
regional-time level only. The regressions also contain the full set of regional, sectoral 
and time dummies17. 
 
The following models are estimated, where the subscript "i" stands for industry "r" 
stands for region, "t" stands for time and “s” stands for the three size categories 
s1<50, s2=[51-250], s3>25018: 
 
                                                 
15 For example, consider two sectors only, with natural entry rates of 0 and 1, respectively. The 
interaction term  Entry EU [1998-2003] * INSTITUTION Region-Year(-1) will capture exactly the impact of 
institutions on the 100% entry sector with respect to the no entry one. 
16 We also use USA data for 1998-1999 as robustness check. They results are broadly, but not 
fully, consistent and we attribute this to three reasons: 1) the natural entry rates concept is better 
assessed as a long longer average (in EU is 1998-2003) 2) we lose many sectors when using the 
USA data, 3) We do not have size specific entry rates for USA. 
17 The inclusion of time dummies is alternative to time trend and it is particularly important for 
non stationary time series. The entry rates have been showing a decreasing pattern between 1996 
and 2008 and this will be captured by time dummies. However, the panel time series do not show 
the existence of a unit root, which would possibly bias the estimates of the coefficients. See 
Appendix 3 for a battery of tests on unit root in panels for our dataset.  
18 For robustness check the same regressions are also run with the institutional variables loaded 









Entry r,i,t,s = ∑s σ s Entry EUs [1998-2003] * INST R-Yr(-1)  + ∑s ∑ r β rs D rs + ∑s ∑ i β is D is + ∑ t β t 
D t +ε r,i,t,s 
(2) 
 
In equation 2  the interaction term between institutions and the natural entry rate, as 
well as  regional and sectoral dummies, are included for all the three size categories -





In reporting the estimation results for equations (1) and (2), we are particularly 
interested in the sign of the coefficients σ and σ (s1), σ (s2), σ (s3) stemming from the 
coefficient of the interacted terms by size (∑s σ s). The dependent variable is the 1-year 
entry rate at the level of the sector, region and year in equation (1) and the 1-year 
entry rate at the level of the sector, region, and year and size category in equation (2) 
19. Thus, the former exploits the three dimensional data base (region, industry and 
time), whereas the latter exploits the four dimensional one (region, industry, time and 
size). These results are discussed in section 5.1. The results using the Petrov 
democratisation measure are reported in section 5.2.  
 
Our empirical investigation poses the question whether industries characterised by 
higher ''natural entry rates'' will suffer relatively more in terms of entry if based in 
regions with an adverse business climate, measured by the uncertainty about  
governors’ continued incumbency in office and political inclination (pro-incumbent 
                                                 
19 We also run all regressions with the 2 year entry rate as dependent variable and the results are 
fully consistent with the 1 year entry results (available on request by the authors). 
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versus opposition). As explained in section 3 (with more details in appendix 2), we 
constructed the governor’s political discontinuity indicator on a [0,3] scale. To 
facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients of the Tobit regression model, we adopt 
two transformations: we re-scaled the institutional variables (democratisation as well 
as the governors turnovers) so that they strictly vary in the [0,1] interval; we report 
the Tobit marginal effects on truncated expected value at 0 (lower bound) and 1 
(upper bound). These transformations allow us to interpret the magnitude of the σ 
and σ s coefficients as the percentage decrease of the natural entry rate for an average 
region passing from the best to the most uncertain political/democratisation 





5.1 Governors’ Turnovers and the entry rates 
 
TABLE 1.—INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF ENTRY 
         
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
     
 Election  Governor’s Change Elite’s Change Pol. Discontinuity 
 Y(-1) Y (-2) Y(-1) Y(-2) Y(-1) Y(-2) Y(-1) Y(-2) 
         
Entry EU [1998-2003] * Elect Year(-1) 0.010        
 (0.095)        
Entry EU [1998-2003] * Elect Year(-2))  -0.071       
  (0.086)       
Entry EU [1998-2003] * Gov Change 
Year(-1) 
  -0.493***      
   (0.121)      
Entry EU [1998-2003] * Gov Change 
Year(-2) 
   -0.670***     
    (0.174)     
Entry EU [1998-2003] * Elite Change 
Year(-1) 
    -0.046    
     (0.092)    
Entry EU [1998-2003] * Elite Change 
Year(-2) 
     -0.122   
      (0.161)   
Entry EU [1998-2003] *  
Pol. Discontinuity Year(-1) 
      -0.168*  
       (0.086)  
Entry EU [1998-2003] *  
Pol. Discontinuity Year(-2) 
       -0.303*** 
        (0.073) 
         
Di: 2 Digit NACE Sector 
Dummies 
Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** 
         
Dr: Regions Dummies Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** 
         
Dt: Year Dummies Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** 
          
Observations 51600 47300 51600 47300 51600 47300 51600 47300 
         
Tobit Regression, coefficients and bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors' computations on 
ORBIS Database (BvD August 2010 release) and ‘Governors’ cumulative Turnover data’ (see text and appendix 2 for details). Notes: dependent variable defined as 
1-year entry rate in the region, sector and year. ‘Natural entry’ rate defined as 1-year entry in European Union as 1998-2003 average within the relevant 2-digit 
NACE rev. 1.1 sector. Coefficients reported as marginal effect on truncated expected value at 0 (lower bound) and 1 (upper bound). All regressions include 88 




Table 1 reports four institutional variables and two specifications for each of them, i.e. 
1 year and 2 years lags. Columns (i) and (ii) refer to the “Election” variable (0 no 
election, 1 election year). We do not register any effect. This is  presumably because 
the timing of elections in Russia are perfectly predictable and therefore one would not 
expect them to have an impact on the decision to enter in a market, unless one also 
expects some political change to accompany the election (see regression by size 
categories). Columns (iii) and (iv) refer to “Governor’s Change” variable (0 no change, 
1 change of governor). If we interpret a change of governor as an indicator of 
increased political instability, we can register a decreased likelihood of entry of the 
order of 49% (67%) of the natural entry rate one year (two years) after the change of 
governor. This is not negligible: for example, an industry with a natural entry rate of 
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5% (e.g. sale motor vehicles), which is located in a region passing from no political 
change to the replacement of the governor, would experience a reduction of entry of 
the order of the 49% of its natural entry rate, i.e. 2.5 percentage points loss after one 
year. The effect would be even bigger two years after the change (-3.35%). Columns 
(v), (vi) refer to the variable measuring a change of governor as well as a change of the 
political elite (0 no change in political elite, 1 otherwise). The election of a “new” 
governor belonging to an “opposition”20 political circle of the incumbent has a negative 
impact (1 and 2 years later) on entry, but the coefficients are not significant. 
 
Finally, columns (vii) and (viii) refer to our preferred summary indicator of political 
discontinuity variable (normalised on the [0,1] interval) and we find that if there is 
less predictability in the political arena, i.e. there is higher discontinuity with respect 
to the previous gubernatorial situation, there is an important negative effect on entry 
after two years21. 
 
                                                 
20 Opposition with respect to the incumbent, not with respect to any left/right political spectrum. 
21 The coefficient is -0.303***: in case of a region passing from the status quo to the higher 
discontinuity (replacement of the incumbent governor with a new governor from the opposition) 
there will be a decrease of 30% in the sector specific natural entry rate. We also run a “horse race” 
type of regression by including all the three indicators (election, governor’s change, elite’s 




TABLE 2.—INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF ENTRY: THE SIZE EFFECT 
         
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
         
 Election Governor’s Change Elite’s Change Political Discontinuity 
 Y(-1) Y(-2) Y(-1) Y(-2) Y(-1) Y(-2) Y(-1) Y(-2) 
         
{Small} Entry EU [1998-2003] * 
Elect Year(-1) 
0.202***        
 (0.051)        
{Medium} Entry EU [1998-2003] 
* Elect Year(-1) 
-1.598***        
 (0.161)        
{Large} Entry EU [1998-2003] * 
Elect Year(-1) 
-3.413***        
 (0.194)        
{Small} Entry EU [1998-2003] * 
Elect Year(-2) 
 0.222***       
  (0.043)       
{Medium} Entry EU [1998-2003] 
* Elect Year(-2) 
 -1.537***       
  (0.194)       
{Large} Entry EU [1998-2003] * 
Elect Year(-2) 
 -3.336***       
  (0.327)       
{Small} Entry EU [1998-2003] * 
Gov Year(-1) 
  0.082      
   (0.053)      
{Medium} Entry EU [1998-2003] 
* Gov Year(-1) 
  -1.657***      
   (0.353)      
{Large} Entry EU [1998-2003] * 
Gov Year(-1) 
  -3.215***      
   (0.355)      
{Small} Entry EU [1998-2003] * 
Gov Year(-2) 
   0.074     
    (0.071)     
{Medium} Entry EU [1998-2003] 
* Gov Year(-2) 
   -1.490***     
    (0.316)     
{Large} Entry EU [1998-2003] * 
Gov Year(-2) 
   -3.067***     
    (0.516)     
{Small} Entry EU [1998-2003] * 
Same Elite Year(-1) 
    0.116    
     (0.075)    
{Medium} Entry EU [1998-2003] 
* Same Elite Year(-1) 
    -2.179***    
     (0.280)    
{Large} Entry EU [1998-2003] * 
Same Elite Year(-1) 
    -3.648***    
     (0.497)    
{Small} Entry EU [1998-2003] * 
Elite Change Year(-2) 
     0.066   
      (0.112)   
{Medium} Entry EU [1998-2003] 
* Elite Change Year(-2) 
     -1.942***   
      (0.164)   
{Large} Entry EU [1998-2003] * 
Elite Change Year(-2) 
     -3.394***   
      (0.595)   
{Small} Entry EU [1998-2003] * 
Pol Discontinuity Year(-1) 
      0.116  
       (0.081)  
{Medium} Entry EU [1998-2003] 
* Pol Discontinuity Year(-1) 
      -1.682***  
       (0.148)  
{Large} Entry EU [1998-2003] * 
Pol Discontinuity Year(-1) 
      -3.387***  
       (0.326)  
{Small} Entry EU [1998-2003] * 
Pol Discontinuity Year(-2) 
       0.114 
        (0.075) 
{Medium} Entry EU [1998-2003] 
* Pol Discontinuity Year(-2) 
       -1.557*** 
        (0.089) 
{Large} Entry EU [1998-2003] * 
Pol Discontinuity Year(-2) 
       -3.283*** 
        (0.221) 
Dr*[size]: Regions * Size 
Dummies 
Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** 
         
Di*[size]: 2 Digit NACE 
Sector * Size Dummies 
Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** 
         
Dt: Year Dummies Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** Y*** 
         
         
Observations 109404 100287 109404 100287 109404 100287 109404 100287 
         
Tobit Regression, coefficients and bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors' computations on ORBIS 
Database (BvD August 2010 release) and ‘Governors’ cumulative Turnover data’ (see text and appendix 2 for details). Notes: dependent variable defined as 1-year 
entry rate in the region, sector, size and year. ‘Natural entry’ rate defined as 1-year entry in European Union as 1998-2003 average within the relevant 2-digit 
NACE rev. 1.1 sector. Coefficients reported as marginal effect on truncated expected value at 0 (lower bound) and 1 (upper bound). All regressions include [88 
Macro Regions]*[size], [62 Sector]*[size] and 13 Time dummies. the null hypothesis of joint zero coefficients for the Dr*[size]; Di*[size], Dt, respectively, is always 




These results bundle together all type of firms, small, medium and large. In Table 2, 
we dissect the differential impact of political predictability on these three categories of 
firms and we discover much richer dynamics. In fact, we find that regardless of lag, 
the impact of the political instability is much more marked for large firms, and to 
some extent medium sized ones when there are elections, change of governors and 
change of elite, whereas the effects are in-significant -or positive and significant in 
case of elections- for small firms. This result is important because small firms 
represent a higher proportion of the enterprise sample (44%), so the average not-
significant result showed in Table 1 is therefore affected by this sample composition. 
When this is taken in to account the detrimental effect on medium and especially big 
firms is even more marked. Columns (vii) and (viii) signal a strong negative impact of 
political discontinuity on medium and especially big firms, whereas small firm show 
to be un-affected (not significant coefficients) by our preferred summary indicator. 
 
We therefore find that discontinuity of the political and business environment in a 
region exerts a significant negative effect on the deviation of entry rates by sector 
from their “natural” levels. While the election process per se does not affect the 
deviation, a replacement or electoral defeat of an incumbent governor has a marked 
effect on the entry process; halving the natural rate within one year and decreasing it 
even more in a subsequent year. This result is robust to alternative specifications that 
take account of the size distribution of firms. Interestingly, it would seem that 
political discontinuity impacts most on larger firms. The highly personalized and 
informal character of regional government is highlighted by the fact that this negative 
effect of gubernatorial change is independent of the political direction of that change. 
We do not in our study make any analysis of the attitudes or the policy stances of 
either gubernatorial incumbents or their opponents. Thus, a change in governor in our 
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dataset may imply the replacement of a “red” governor by a pro-market reformer, or 
the converse. It is the fact that the governor has changed, and presumably that 
therefore the political, economic policy and business environment will alter, that leads 
to the reduction in entry rates rather than the political character of that change.  
 
In the next section, we go on to consider whether the deviation of entry rates from 
their natural sectoral levels is also influenced by the nature of the regional political 
environment. One might expect that more vigorous political support for market 
structures, property rights and competition would stimulate entry. Hence one might 
infer that gubernatorial changes which enhance entry might be associated with 
political shifts in a pro-market direction. However, one cannot necessarily infer this 
from our data. This is because the two data sources are unrelated. The political 
change data was collected by ourselves (see appendix 2 for details) and can be 
regarded as exogenous from the entry process; the timing of elections and their results 
seem highly unlikely to be caused by entry rates up to two years hence. The second 
data source, from McFaul, Petrov, and Ryabov (2004), is much richer in that it seeks 
to identify the quality of local democracy, which as noted above, Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005), among others regard as a key indicator of the quality of market 
supporting institutions more generally. It may help us to infer the relationship 
between gubernatorial change and the policy environment. However, it is less obvious 
that reverse causality can be ruled out with the use of this dataset; high entry rates 
may help to engender a more democratic political environment to some extent, though 
perhaps this is less likely when lags are taken into account. Moreover, we do not 
analyse entry rates, but the deviation from their natural level by sector. Nonetheless, 
the regressions which follow potentially enrich our analysis of the institutional 
environment and entry across regions in Russia, but must be regarded as less reliable 




5.2 Democratisation and entry rates 
 
TABLE 3.—DEMOCRATISATION DETERMINANTS OF ENTRY 
    
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
    
 Democratisation Democratisation  
Year (-1) 
Democratisation 
 Year (-2) 




-0.491***   




Year (-1)  
 -0.474***  





  -0.446*** 
   (0.105) 
    
Di: 2 Digit NACE 
Sector Dummies 
Y*** Y*** Y*** 
    
Dr: Regions 
Dummies 
Y*** Y*** Y*** 
    
Dt: Year Dummies Y*** Y*** Y*** 
    
Observations 55900 51600 47300 
    
Tobit Regression, coefficients and bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors' computations on 
ORBIS Database (BvD August 2010 release) and Petrov democratisation variable: dem1 is a 1991-2001 time invariant variable; dem2 is a 2000-2004 time 
invariant variable; dem3 is a 2001-2006 time invariant variable. These  are merged to create a time variant democratisation variables on the 1996-2008 time span, 
that is loaded as contemporaneous (i), lag 1 (ii) and lag 2 (iii)  (see text and appendix 2 for further details). Notes: dependent variable defined as 1-year entry rate in 
the region, sector and year. ‘Natural entry’ rate defined as 1-year entry in European Union as 1998-2003 average within the relevant 2-digit NACE rev. 1.1 sector. 
Coefficients reported as marginal effect on truncated expected value at 0 (lower bound) and 1 (upper bound). All regressions include 88 Macro Regions, 62 Sector 
and 13 Time dummies. The null hypothesis of joint zero coefficients for the Dr, Di and Dt, respectively, is always rejected at 1% level (Y***). 
 
 
Therefore, the regressions reported in Tables 3 and 4 test a similar hypothesis with a 
different set of political indicators. We report three columns; using the Petrov index 
contemporaneously, and with one and two years of lag. The results are initially 
counterintuitive. The coefficient on the interactive term is always negative, which 
implies that, the deviation from natural entry rates is higher in regions in which 
higher levels of political competition and transparency are greater. Turning to Table 
4, which replicates the previous experiment controlling for firm size, we find an 
explanation. The direction of the impact of the degree of democratization on entry 
rates depends on the size of the entrant. Greater democracy acts to stimulate entry by 
small sized firms, reducing the deviation of entry by sector from their natural rate. 
29 
 
However, greater democratization greatly reduces entry for medium and especially 
the large firms. This effect is so large in scale that it offsets the increases in entry 
with greater democracy in the small size class. These results hold for all three 
specifications of lags. 
 
TABLE 4.—DEMOCRATISATION DETERMINANTS OF ENTRY: SIZE EFFECT 
    
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
    




    
{Small} Entry 
EU [1998-2003] * 
Democratisation 
0.153***   
 (0.042)   
{Medium} Entry 
EU [1998-2003] * 
Democratisation 
-1.088***   
 (0.373)   
{Large} Entry 
EU [1998-2003] * 
Democratisation 
-2.438***   
 (0.396)   
{Small} Entry 
EU [1998-2003] * 
Democratisation 
Year (-1) 
 0.152***  
  (0.023)  
{Medium} Entry 
EU [1998-2003] * 
Democratisation 
Year (-1) 
 -1.247***  
  (0.250)  
{Large} Entry 
EU [1998-2003] * 
Democratisation 
Year (-1) 
 -2.505***  
  (0.095)  
{Small} Entry 
EU [1998-2003] * 
Democratisation 
Year (-2) 
  0.143*** 
   (0.034) 
{Medium} Entry 
EU [1998-2003] * 
Democratisation 
Year (-2) 
  -0.809*** 
   (0.236) 
{Large} Entry 
EU [1998-2003] * 
Democratisation 
Year (-2) 
  -2.215*** 
   (0.367) 
    
Dr*[size]: Regions 
* Size Dummies 
Y*** Y*** Y*** 
    
Di*[size]: 2 Digit 
NACE Sector * 
Size Dummies 
Y*** Y*** Y*** 
    
Dt: Year 
Dummies 
Y*** Y*** Y*** 
    
Observations 118521 109404 100287 
    
Tobit Regression, coefficients and bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: Authors' computations on 
ORBIS Database (BvD August 2010 release) and Petrov democratisation variable: dem1 is a 1991-2001 time invariant variable; dem2 is a 2000-2004 time 
invariant variable; dem3 is a 2001-2006 time invariant variable. These  are merged to create a time variant democratisation variables on the 1996-2008 time span, 
that is loaded as contemporaneous (i), lag 1 (ii) and lag 2 (iii)  (see text and appendix 2 for further details). Notes: dependent variable defined as 1-year entry rate in 
the region, sector, size and year. ‘Natural entry’ rate defined as 1-year entry in European Union as 1998-2003 average within the relevant 2-digit NACE rev. 1.1 
sector. Coefficients reported as marginal effect on truncated expected value at 0 (lower bound) and 1 (upper bound). All regressions include 88 Macro Regions, 62 






Applying the methodology developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and exploited by 
Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006), we analyze the relationship between political 
predictability of the policy environment, the quality of institutions proxied by the 
degree of democratisation and new firm entry.  Similar to Aghion, Fally, and 
Scarpetta (2007), we exploit the within-region differences between industries, firm 
size and time using a regional longitudinal dataset. Russia offers some dimensions of 
a natural quasi-experiment to explore this issue, because the economy is huge and 
regionally diverse and there is great heterogeneity in institutions and the policy 
environment. Moreover, given the transition process which is occurring at an uneven 
rate across Russian regions, there is the possibility of identifying exogenous political 
change which signals adjustments to the political environment. One of the most 
important contributions of the paper is therefore to develop a longitudinal dataset of 
regional political change in Russia, to explore whether this influences the entry 
process.  
 
Our work provides an interesting development of the existing literature on entry and 
the institutional environment. First, we circumvent the problem encountered in 
traditional cross country studies of approximating institutions by country specific 
dummies. Our approach reduces the number of alternative explanations by analysing 
entry in the context of a single national entity. By investigating cross-regional 
variation in entry and the political environment, we are able to control for differences 
in for example macro-economic policy that may influence results in cross-country 
studies. Furthermore, by the use of a new dataset on political change, we have been 
able to allay concerns about endogeneity of institutional indicators. Finally, we extend 
studies of institutional impact on entry, pioneered by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
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Silanes, and Shleifer (2002). While the latter explored the impact of formal 
institutions on entry, this approach was criticised for failing to capture the impact of 
informal practices, which may mitigate the impact of formal regulation of entry, Aidis 
and Adachi (2007). Our work addresses this criticism by taking account of informal 
institutions and demonstrates that institutional environment as a whole has a 
considerable influence on entry rates. 
 
One might expect that entry rates in an emerging market with a legacy of central 
planning might be relatively high, Estrin (2002). This is because to reap economies of 
information, planners tended to rely on relatively few firms so that when the market 
was suddenly introduced, the number of firms in each sector was relatively small 
relative to demand. More generally, the low numbers of firms in developing economies 
suggest that entry rates might be quite high, Tybout (2000), and this is the finding in 
for example Roberts and Tybout (1996). Indeed, we confirm that Russian entry rates 
are not low by international standards though we include small firms in our dataset. 
However, we note a declining trend in entry rates over time. 
 
We go on to show that the deviation of entry rates from their natural sectoral rate 
across regions is exacerbated by political instability. The impact of gubernatorial 
change in reducing entry rates is large, and increases over time between one and two 
years. These results are robust to alternative specifications, for example controlling 
for categories of firm size. We conclude that in Russia, entry is promoted by 
predictability of the regional political arena, which stems from political continuity, be 
it in the form of a re-election of an incumbent or election of a candidate from the same 
political elite.   
 
We also use a dataset from secondary sources to consider the character of the regional 
political regime with respect to democratic institutions. This has the advantage of 
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indicating the direction of the political change implied by the results above, but the 
analysis is less robust in terms of reverse causality. Nonetheless the findings are 
suggestive. In regions which are more transparent and democratic, entry rates of 
small sized firms are increased. However, this effect is more than offset by the 
negative impact of greater democracy for entry by medium and large firms. We offer 
two related explanations. First, the difference in the effect of business environment on 
entry of small firms compared to larger ones may indicate predatory behaviour of the 
state. Big firms are more likely to be targeted by unscrupulous politicians as they are 
more noticeable and generate higher rent. This ‘grabbing hand’ view of the state 
would predict that larger firms are disproportionally affected by a change of 
politicians at the very top of regional administration and therefore are more affected 
by uncertainty and political competition. A somewhat different explanation hinges on 
the necessity of forging close links with the top politicians in order to set up firms and 
prosper as a business. Again, large and medium firms are more likely to rely on 
personal networks with top politicians then small firms. Therefore, disruption of such 
networks through governor change is more likely to impact on entry of larger firms 
and leave smaller businesses relatively unaffected. 
 
Finally, we find that entry is most significantly affected two years after governor 
change. This is in line with the view that entry is a long term project, which spans a 
long time between the initial decision to enter and actual establishment of a firm. 
Although the legal registration of a firm may be completed in a year, creating a going 
concern may take much longer. Therefore, in the initial years after governor change 
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DATA APPENDIX 1: ENTRY RATES SUMMARY STATISTICS 
TABLE A1.1—ENTRY RATES: MEAN AND SD BY SIZE AND TIME LAG 
  All 1 y   All 2 yrs   Small 1 yr   Small 2 yrs   Medium 1 yr   Medium 2 yrs   Big 1 yr   Big 2 yrs 
                        
 Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
                        
1996 11.9% 14.8%  25.0% 21.2%  10.6% 17.8%  21.7% 24.9%  8.2% 20.0%  17.8% 28.9%  6.7% 18.5%  13.6% 26.4% 
1997 10.9% 13.8%  21.2% 19.1%  10.1% 16.7%  19.5% 23.2%  7.6% 18.9%  15.1% 26.4%  5.3% 16.9%  11.7% 24.0% 
1998 10.5% 13.8%  20.0% 18.5%  10.0% 16.3%  18.9% 22.3%  7.4% 18.4%  14.4% 25.3%  5.4% 16.3%  10.4% 22.8% 
1999 11.2% 13.7%  20.4% 18.4%  11.7% 17.7%  20.4% 22.6%  7.5% 18.5%  14.2% 24.9%  4.8% 15.4%  9.9% 21.9% 
2000 12.3% 14.5%  21.9% 18.8%  12.8% 18.2%  22.9% 23.6%  8.0% 19.3%  14.9% 25.6%  5.1% 15.8%  9.6% 21.6% 
2001 10.2% 12.4%  21.0% 18.0%  13.4% 17.3%  24.3% 23.0%  10.5% 21.6%  17.8% 27.2%  5.6% 16.5%  10.3% 22.2% 
2002 11.3% 13.0%  20.2% 16.9%  13.1% 16.7%  24.5% 22.2%  7.7% 17.2%  17.3% 26.1%  4.7% 14.9%  10.0% 21.6% 
2003 12.8% 13.3%  22.5% 17.3%  14.4% 17.4%  25.6% 22.0%  8.9% 18.3%  15.9% 23.9%  4.1% 13.6%  8.5% 19.8% 
2004 6.5% 9.1%  18.3% 15.5%  13.1% 15.4%  25.5% 21.2%  8.4% 17.3%  16.5% 24.0%  4.4% 14.5%  8.3% 19.4% 
2005 6.1% 9.1%  12.1% 12.9%  11.4% 14.1%  22.8% 19.5%  8.6% 18.2%  16.3% 23.9%  4.4% 13.9%  8.5% 19.8% 
2006 6.1% 9.1%  11.7% 13.1%  11.6% 14.2%  21.5% 19.0%  5.8% 14.1%  13.8% 22.2%  2.7% 10.6%  7.0% 17.3% 
2007 4.2% 6.9%  10.0% 11.7%  8.7% 12.2%  19.2% 17.9%  3.5% 11.3%  9.1% 17.6%  1.8% 8.4%  4.5% 13.4% 
2008 2.4% 4.7%  6.5% 8.7%  5.5% 9.0%  13.7% 14.9%  0.8% 5.2%  4.3% 12.3%  0.4% 3.9%  2.2% 9.2% 
                                        
Total  9.0% 12.3%  17.8% 17.4%  11.3% 16.0%  21.6% 21.6%  7.2% 17.5%  14.4% 24.3%  4.3% 14.4%  8.8% 20.6% 
                                                
Source ORBIS database (BvD copyright), August 2010 release for Russian Federation. The overall sample exploits all the firms declaring the date of incorporation, i.e. 85% of the observations from ORBIS (see 
also footnote 7 and 14 in the text). The size level database is build by splitting the overall firm sample in three parts according to their size category. Entry rates are computed within separate categories. Finally the three 
parts are pooled back together in a single size-level database. Some firms do report date of incorporation but not size and therefore are part of the overall sample database. Only firms reporting date of incorporation and 
size are included in the size level data.  
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TABLE A1.2.—ENTRY RATES: MEAN AND SD BY REGION (1996-2008) 
 Mean SD Mean  SD 
Belgorod region 9.8% 10.3% 19.0% 15.0% 
Bryansk region 9.9% 11.0% 19.0% 15.3% 
Vladimir region 8.6% 9.9% 17.3% 14.5% 
Voronezh region 8.7% 7.7% 17.2% 11.3% 
Ivanovo region 9.1% 10.4% 17.9% 15.2% 
Kaluga region 8.5% 8.9% 17.1% 13.2% 
Kostroma region 8.0% 9.4% 15.9% 13.9% 
Kursk region 7.5% 11.9% 15.0% 16.5% 
Lipetsk region 7.8% 11.7% 15.5% 16.7% 
Moscow region 9.6% 7.4% 19.2% 11.7% 
Orel region 8.7% 10.8% 17.7% 16.3% 
Ryazan region 8.0% 9.9% 16.2% 15.0% 
Smolensk region 8.5% 9.6% 16.7% 13.9% 
Tambov region 8.7% 13.7% 17.0% 18.9% 
Tver region 8.5% 9.8% 17.1% 14.7% 
Tula region 7.8% 6.7% 15.5% 10.4% 
Yaroslavl region 8.4% 8.4% 16.4% 12.4% 
Moscow 11.8% 7.7% 23.7% 13.1% 
Republic of Karelia 8.3% 12.2% 16.7% 17.4% 
Komi Republic 9.1% 12.4% 18.3% 17.4% 
Arkhangelsk region 8.2% 10.7% 16.6% 15.3% 
Nenets AO not in the list 7.4% 19.1% 15.0% 26.5% 
Vologoda region 10.1% 11.6% 19.8% 16.2% 
Kaliningrad region 8.7% 9.3% 17.6% 14.6% 
Leningrad region 8.4% 9.0% 17.0% 14.1% 
Murmansk region 7.4% 9.6% 15.1% 14.4% 
Novgorod region 8.1% 10.7% 16.2% 15.6% 
Pskov region 9.1% 11.4% 18.0% 16.2% 
Saint Petersburg 9.0% 7.8% 18.0% 12.8% 
Republic of Adygeya 9.0% 13.3% 17.5% 18.4% 
Republic of Dagestan 5.8% 9.6% 12.4% 14.9% 
Republic of Ingooshetia 9.2% 16.2% 18.7% 22.7% 
Kabardino Balkarian Republic 5.5% 10.2% 11.4% 14.9% 
Republic of Kalmykia 8.7% 15.7% 18.2% 23.8% 
Karachayevo Cherkessian Republic 6.5% 13.2% 13.0% 18.1% 
Republic of North Ossetia Altania 5.4% 8.5% 11.3% 13.5% 
Chechen Republic* 16.6% 25.8% 29.9% 33.7% 
Krasnodar Territory 7.9% 7.3% 16.0% 11.0% 
Stavropol Territory 8.8% 9.8% 17.7% 14.4% 
Astrakhan region 8.2% 10.2% 16.3% 14.7% 
Volgograd region 10.3% 9.8% 20.2% 14.2% 
Rostov region 8.5% 8.1% 17.2% 12.2% 
Republic of Bashkorstan 9.6% 9.6% 19.3% 14.2% 
Republic of Marij El 8.6% 11.9% 17.0% 16.8% 
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Republic of Mordovia 8.2% 11.6% 16.1% 15.9% 
Republic of Tatarstan 9.3% 8.3% 18.8% 12.5% 
Udmurtian Republic 8.1% 7.5% 16.0% 11.4% 
Chuvashi Republic 10.2% 12.0% 19.9% 16.7% 
Kirov region 9.4% 11.3% 18.4% 16.4% 
Nizhnii Novgorod region 8.6% 9.1% 17.3% 13.1% 
Orenburg region 8.9% 10.3% 17.7% 14.5% 
Penza region 9.5% 11.1% 18.4% 15.3% 
Perm region 10.8% 9.5% 21.1% 13.5% 
Komi Permiatsk AO not in the list 6.7% 17.0% 13.0% 23.2% 
Samara region 10.4% 6.9% 20.8% 11.4% 
Saratov region 8.7% 9.3% 17.4% 14.2% 
Ulyanovsk region 10.5% 9.7% 20.6% 14.1% 
Kurgan region 7.6% 9.8% 15.4% 14.6% 
Sverdlovsk region 9.3% 9.2% 19.0% 14.9% 
Tyumen region 8.4% 9.6% 17.1% 14.6% 
Khanty Mansijsk Autonomous District 9.0% 12.5% 18.0% 17.8% 
Yamalo Nenets Autonomous District 9.1% 13.9% 18.1% 19.4% 
Chelyabinsk region 8.6% 7.0% 17.5% 11.6% 
Altai Republic 12.2% 19.6% 23.2% 26.3% 
Republic of Buryatia 9.3% 15.0% 18.6% 20.4% 
Republic of Tuva 9.4% 17.3% 18.5% 23.0% 
Republic of Khakassia 9.4% 14.3% 18.3% 19.2% 
Altayski Krai Region 8.7% 10.0% 17.4% 14.3% 
Krasnoyarsk Territory 9.1% 7.8% 18.2% 11.6% 
Taimyr (DolganoNenets) Autonomous District 8.2% 17.5% 16.6% 24.2% 
Evenk Autonomous District 8.7% 22.4% 16.4% 30.0% 
Irkutsk region 9.0% 8.7% 17.9% 12.3% 
Ust Ordyn Buryat Autonomous District 8.3% 18.3% 16.4% 25.3% 
Kemerovo region 11.2% 10.9% 21.8% 15.5% 
Novosibirsk region 10.6% 9.7% 20.8% 14.1% 
Omsk region 10.5% 11.7% 20.4% 16.5% 
Tomsk region 9.7% 9.8% 19.0% 13.6% 
Chita region 7.3% 12.3% 14.5% 17.1% 
Aginsk Buryat Autonomous District 7.9% 18.6% 15.3% 25.1% 
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 9.7% 11.4% 19.7% 17.0% 
Primorie Territory 9.2% 9.4% 18.7% 14.1% 
Khabarovsk Territory 9.4% 10.0% 18.9% 15.2% 
Amur region 9.3% 15.1% 18.0% 20.5% 
Kamchatka region 7.2% 9.6% 14.9% 14.4% 
Koryak Autonomous District 6.8% 17.1% 14.3% 25.4% 
Magadan region 7.7% 12.9% 15.7% 18.4% 
Sakhalin region 8.4% 11.0% 16.6% 16.1% 
Jewish Autonomous District 10.6% 18.2% 20.6% 24.7% 
Chukotka Autonomous District 7.0% 16.4% 14.8% 23.2% 
     
Total 9.0% 11.9% 17.8% 17.0% 
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Source ORBIS database (BvD copyright), August 2010 release for Russian Federation. NACE rev 1.1 ISIC Excluding; 
agriculture, mining, utility, financial intermediation and public administration. Sector “100” is the Total aggregated entry. Graph A1 






DATA APPENDIX 2: A CLOSER LOOK AT DEMOCRATISATION AND THE POLITICAL 
TURNOVERS VARIABLES 
 
Regional political and economic openness dataset 
 
Measures of regional political and economic openness were used to estimate 
transparency and predictability of regional political and economic processes based on a 
number of indicators. This data was sourced from Nikolay Petrov and Aleksei Titkov at 
the Carnegie Moscow Center22. The dataset includes 10 sub-indicators, which together 
provide an assessment of political and economic openness in each region. In our 
estimations, we use both a cumulative variable for democratisation (composed out of 9 
sub-indicators, i.e. excluding economic liberalisation), and the 10 sub-indicators 
separately. The sub-indicators give respectively an account of political factors (political 
openness, elections, pluralism, regional political structure), economic factors (economic 
liberalization, corruption), and civil-society and social factors (media, civil society, elites, 
local self-government).  
 
Openness is an indicator of the openness or foreclosure of political life (with respect to 
transparency and inclusion into national processes), whereas elections captures the 
quality of political competition in regional elections at all levels (barriers to 
participation, use of administrative resources in favour of incumbents, political 
interference). Pluralism measures the presence and number of stable parties, factions 
and coalitions in legislative assemblies. Regional political structure is an overall 
indicator of the quality of political and judicial processes in a region, of respect for civil 
rights, as well as an assessment of the respective weight of elections and appointments.  
 
Economic liberalization captures the degree of privatization as well as the quality of 
regional legislative and legal practice in regard to local enterprises, whereas corruption 
                                                 
22 accessible under: http://atlas.socpol.ru/indexes/index_democr.shtml  
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measures the degree of overlap between political and economic elites and the number of 
corruption scandals in the period observed.  
 
Finally, media measures the degree of media independence, the role taken by the media 
in regional political life and potential interference by politicians. Civil society accounts 
for the number of NGOs, referendums and forms of unsanctioned public activity. Elites 
stands for the diversity, reproduction and turnover of regional elites and their capacity 
to coordinate their interests and avoid political breakdown and instability. Local self 
government measures the presence of elected bodies of local self-government and their 
activeness and influence.  
 
The cumulative variable for democratisation is divided by Petrov in three time spans, 
within which it is time invariant: 1991-2001 (called dem1); 2000-2004 (called dem2); 
2001-2006 (called dem3). In our data base ‘dem1’ ‘dem2’ and ‘dem3’ are merged over time 
to create a time variant democratisation variables on the 1996-2008 time span, that is 
then loaded as contemporaneous, lagged 1 year or lagged 2 years in the regressions. 
 
Governor turnover dataset 
 
In order to capture the uncertainty associated with governor turnover and the 
consequential shift in regional policies, we constructed a dataset measuring political 
change at the governor level. The dataset covers the period 1996 – 2009 and reports 
instances when the incumbent governor’s term in the office expired (whether he or she 
stood for re-election or re-appointment), instances of governor change (again, whether 
through elections or re-appointment) and quality of such change. While for the period 
1996 – 2004 we report elections, for 2005 - 2009 we report appointments, as governors 
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were directly appointed by the president from September 2004 onwards, following a 
constitutional change after the hostage crisis in Beslan.23 
 
The dataset further specifies if a newly elected or appointed governor shares the same 
political background as his predecessor, or comes from a different political group, thus 
controlling for a change in regional political elites. We finally constructed a set of 
cumulative variables, permitting us to control for the frequency and overall amount of 
political change in each region.  
 
Data on governor change, elections and appointments have been collected from regional 
websites, a website on Russian administrative divisions (http://rulers.org/russdiv.html), 
and the Russian version of Wikipedia, using several sources for each case to check for 
consistency. To measure the degree of uncertainty associated with possible continuity or 
discontinuity of current economic and political practice we distinguished between 
governors from the same political elite and governors from the oppositional elite. 
Governors were assumed to belong to the same political elite if they came from the 
predecessor’s political circle (i.e. friend, relative or deputy governor) or came from a 
similar professional background, such security forces or, in some instances, came from 
the same political party. A candidate was assumed to come from an oppositional elite 
group if he did not belong to the governor’s political circle. To determine whether a new 
                                                 
23 Russian political system has undergone several changes that have affected stability of regional 
institutions. Prior to 1996 local regional authorities were appointed by Yeltsin. In 1996 popular 
elections replaced presidential appointments, opening doors to political contestation among local 
as well as national political elites vying to influence local political and economic processes. In 
2005 the political system made a full circle as Russia yet again set on a course towards higher 
centralised control. President Putin announced introduction of gubernatorial appointments by the 
president, which from 2005 onwards replaced popular elections for gubernatorial post, previously 
held in the regions. The new process of presidential appointments involves three procedural steps. 
First, the potential candidates for gubernatorial seat are selected by presidential envoy to the 
federal district and submitted to the president. Alternatively, the party with majority seats in 
regional parliament can also make its recommendations. Second, the president nominates his 
preferred candidate and informs the regional assembly of his choice. In the third step, regional 
assembly needs to approve the nominee by a majority of votes in order for the presidential 
candidate to take up his seat. 
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governor had the same political background as his predecessor, we checked the personal 
background of each governor, using web resources on personal profiles such as 
www.lenta.ru and www.russiaprofile.org.  
 
As we are interested in the change of the governing elite in a specific region, it was not 
always sufficient to look for political affiliation, as two subsequent governors might both 
belong to the same party (e.g. United Russia), but defend different regional agendas or 
economic interests, and belong to different clans or groupings. If cases were not clear, we 
consulted additional information from articles in the regional and national press, as well 
as from publications on the political economy of Russia's regions, e.g. Moses (2002), 
Konitzer (2005), Moraski (2006).  
 
From 2005 to 2008, a number of regions were merged or added to other, larger regions 
(with 6 entities having lost their autonomy to date). However, this does not significantly 
affect the sample, as these regions were often very small. Finally, for Chechnya we 
adopted official Russian data on government changes. Although Chechnya is of course a 
special case, we opted for three elite changes in 1996/1997, 2000 and 2003, as it could be 
argued that from 2003 onwards the elites in control belonged to the Kadyrov family. In 
any case, taking Chechnya out of the sample does not significantly alter our results.  
46 
 
TABLE A2.1.— POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OPENNESS: MEAN & SD BY REGION (1991-2006) 
 dem1  
1991 - 2001 
dem2  
2000 - 2004 
dem3 
2001 - 2006 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Belgorod region 2,8 0,42 2,5 0,53 2,5 0,53 
Bryansk region 2,8 0,42 2,8 0,42 2,7 0,48 
Vladimir region 2,9 0,32 3,4 0,52 3,5 0,53 
Voronezh region 2,5 0,53 2,0 0,32 3,2 0,63 
Ivanovo region 2,9 0,32 2,7 0,48 2,9 0,57 
Kaluga region 2,9 0,32 3,1 0,32 3,3 0,48 
Kostroma region 3,1 0,32 3 0 2,9 0,57 
Kursk region 2,1 0,32 2,2 0,42 2,2 0,42 
Lipetsk region 2,7 0,48 2,6 0,52 2,8 0,42 
Moscow region 3 0,82 3,5 0,71 2,8 0,79 
Orel region 2,2 0,42 2,4 0,52 2,6 0,52 
Ryazan region 2,7 0,48 2,8 0,42 3 0,67 
Smolensk region 2,7 0,48 2,7 0,48 2,7 0,48 
Tambov region 2,6 0,52 2,8 0,42 2,8 0,42 
Tver region 2,8 0,42 3 0,47 3,5 0,71 
Tula region 2,6 0,52 2,8 0,42 3 0 
Yaroslavl region 3,7 0,48 3,1 0,32 3,8 0,63 
Moscow 2,9 0,88 3,1 0,88 3 0,94 
Republic of Karelia 4,1 0,57 4,1 0,57 4 0,47 
Komi Republic 2,7 0,67 3,6 0,7 3,5 0,53 
Arkhangelsk region 3,7 0,67 3,6 0,7 3,5 0,53 
Nenets AO not in the list 3,7 0,67 3,7 0,48 4,1 0,57 
Vologoda region 3,2 0,42 2,9 0,32 2,9 0,32 
Kaliningrad region 3,4 0,97 3,5 0,71 3,6 0,84 
Leningrad region 3,2 0,63 3,5 0,53 3,5 0,53 
Murmansk region 3 0 3,1 0,32 3,3 0,48 
Novgorod region 3 1,33 3,5 0,71 3,3 0,48 
Pskov region 2,7 0,48 3,4 0,52 3,6 0,52 
Saint Petersburg 4,5 0,85 4,1 0,88 4 0,82 
Republic of Adygeya 2,2 0,63 2,3 0,48 2,5 0,53 
Republic of Dagestan 2,4 0,97 2,5 0,85 2,5 0,85 
Republic of Ingooshetia 1,5 0,53 1,7 0,48 1,7 0,48 
Kabardino Balkarian Republic 1,7 0,48 1,7 0,48 1,8 0,42 
Republic of Kalmykia 1,4 0,52 2 0,47 2,2 0,42 
Karachayevo Cherkessian Republic 2,4 0,52 2,3 0,48 2,4 0,7 
Republic of North Ossetia Altania 1,9 0,32 1,9 0,32 2 0,47 
Chechen Republic* n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Krasnodar Territory 2,6 0,7 2,7 0,48 2,8 0,79 
Stavropol Territory 2,5 0,53 2,7 0,48 3,2 0,63 
Astrakhan region 2,8 0,42 2,7 0,48 3 0,67 
Volgograd region 3,4 0,52 3,2 0,42 3,5 0,85 
Rostov region 2,4 0,52 2,6 0,52 2,5 0,53 
Republic of Bashkorstan 1,8 0,92 1,8 0,42 2 0,47 
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Republic of Marij El 2,8 0,42 2,7 0,48 2,6 0,52 
Republic of Mordovia 2,1 0,32 2 0 2 0 
Republic of Tatarstan 2,3 0,82 2,3 0,48 2,5 0,53 
Udmurtian Republic 3,3 0,67 3 0,47 3 0 
Chuvashi Republic 3,1 0,57 3,3 0,67 3,2 0,42 
Kirov region 2,9 0,32 2,8 0,42 2,9 0,32 
Nizhnii Novgorod region 4 0,67 4,1 0,57 3,8 0,42 
Orenburg region 2,6 0,52 3 0 3 0 
Penza region 2,5 0,53 2,7 0,48 2,8 0,42 
Perm region 4,1 0,32 4,1 0,57 4,3 0,67 
Komi Permiatsk AO  2,6 0,52 2,9 0,32 - - 
Samara region 3,7 0,82 4,2 0,63 4,5 0,71 
Saratov region 2,6 0,52 2,6 0,52 2,8 0,63 
Ulyanovsk region 2,4 0,84 2,5 0,53 2,9 0,32 
Kurgan region 2,4 0,52 2,4 0,52 2,4 0,52 
Sverdlovsk region 4,3 1,06 4,5 0,71 4,2 0,79 
Tyumen region 3 0,47 3,4 0,52 3,3 0,48 
Khanty Mansijsk AO  3,2 0,63 3,3 0,48 3,4 0,52 
Yamalo Nenets AO 2,8 0,42 2,9 0,57 3 0,47 
Chelyabinsk region 3,4 0,52 3,6 0,52 3,6 0,7 
Altai Republic 2,8 0,42 2,7 0,48 3 0,47 
Republic of Buryatia 3 0 3 0 3,1 0,32 
Republic of Tuva 1,9 0,57 1,7 0,48 1,8 0,42 
Republic of Khakassia 2,9 0,57 2,3 0,48 2,4 0,52 
Altayski Krai Region 2,5 0,53 2,7 0,67 3,5 0,53 
Krasnoyarsk Territory 3,3 0,67 4,1 0,57 4,3 0,48 
Taimyr (DolganoNenets)  AO 2,4 0,52 2,6 0,52 2,6 0,52 
Evenk Autonomous District 1,9 0,57 2 0,47 2,1 0,32 
Irkutsk region 3,7 0,48 3,6 0,52 4 0,67 
Ust Ordyn Buryat AO 1,9 0,57 2 0,47 2 0,67 
Kemerovo region 2,8 0,63 2,5 0,53 2,4 0,52 
Novosibirsk region 3,7 0,48 3,9 0,57 4 0,47 
Omsk region 2,9 0,32 2,9 0,32 3 0,47 
Tomsk region 2,9 0,32 3 0 3,3 0,67 
Chita region 2,5 0,53 2,6 0,52 2,7 0,48 
Aginsk Buryat Autonomous District 1,8 0,63 1,8 0,63 1,8 0,63 
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 2,1 0,57 2,8 0,42 2,7 0,48 
Primorie Territory 2,3 0,82 2,8 0,63 2,8 0,63 
Khabarovsk Territory 2,5 0,53 2,5 0,53 2,9 0,32 
Amur region 2,6 0,52 2,6 0,52 3 0,67 
Kamchatka region 2,9 0,57 2,9 0,74 3,2 0,79 
Koryak Autonomous District 2,4 0,7 2,2 0,63 2,4 0,84 
Magadan region 2,6 0,52 2,9 0,32 3,1 0,32 
Sakhalin region 3,3 0,48 3,3 0,48 3,5 0,53 
Jewish Autonomous District 2,3 0,48 2,3 0,48 2,3 0,48 
Chukotka Autonomous District 1,7 0,48 2 0,67 1,8 0,63 
Total 2,75 0,55 2,86 0,49 2,97 0,53 
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TABLE A2.2. —  GOVERNORS’ TURNOVER BY REGION, CUMULATIVE VARIABLES (1996-2009) 




Belgorod region 3 0 0 3 
Bryansk region 4 2 1 7 
Vladimir region 3 1 1 5 
Voronezh region 4 3 3 10 
Ivanovo region 3 3 2 8 
Kaluga region 4 2 0 6 
Kostroma region 4 2 2 8 
Kursk region 3 2 2 7 
Lipetsk region 3 1 1 5 
Moscow region 3 1 1 5 
Orel region 3 1 1 5 
Ryazan region 4 3 2 9 
Smolensk region 4 3 2 9 
Tambov region 3 1 1 5 
Tver region 3 1 1 5 
Tula region 3 2 2 7 
Yaroslavl region 3 1 1 5 
Moscow 4 0 0 4 
Republic of Karelia 3 1 1 5 
Komi Republic 3 1 1 5 
Arkhangelsk region 4 3 2 9 
Nenets AO  5 4 3 12 
Vologoda region 4 1 0 5 
Kaliningrad region 3 3 3 9 
Leningrad region 5 2 2 9 
Murmansk region 5 2 2 9 
Novgorod region 3 1 1 5 
Pskov region 4 3 3 10 
Saint Petersburg 4 2 2 8 
Republic of Adygeya 3 2 2 7 
Republic of Dagestan 1 1 0 2 
Republic of Ingooshetia 4 3 2 9 
Kabardino Balkarian Republic 3 1 1 5 
Republic of Kalmykia 2 0 0 2 
Karachayevo Cherkessian Republic 3 2 2 8 
Republic of North Ossetia Altania 3 2 1 6 
Chechen Republic* 6 6 3 15 
Krasnodar Territory 4 2 1 7 
Stavropol Territory 4 2 1 7 
Astrakhan region 4 1 0 5 
Volgograd region 4 2 2 8 
Rostov region 3 0 0 3 
Republic of Bashkorstan 3 0 0 3 
Republic of Marij El 4 2 2 8 
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Republic of Mordovia 3 0 0 3 
Republic of Tatarstan 3 0 0 3 
Udmurtian Republic 3 0 0 3 
Chuvashi Republic 3 0 0 3 
Kirov region 4 3 2 9 
Nizhnii Novgorod region 3 3 2 8 
Orenburg region 3 1 1 5 
Penza region 3 1 1 5 
Perm region 4 3 0 7 
Komi Permiatsk AO  2 0 0 2 
Samara region 4 1 0 5 
Saratov region 3 2 2 7 
Ulyanovsk region 4 2 2 8 
Kurgan region 4 1 0 5 
Sverdlovsk region 4 1 1 6 
Tyumen region 3 2 1 6 
Khanty Mansijsk Autonomous District 3 0 0 3 
Yamalo Nenets Autonomous District 3 0 0 3 
Chelyabinsk region 3 1 1 5 
Altai Republic 3 3 1 7 
Republic of Buryatia 2 1 1 4 
Republic of Tuva 3 2 0 5 
Republic of Khakassia 4 2 2 8 
Altayski Krai Region 4 3 2 9 
Krasnoyarsk Territory 3 2 2 7 
Taimyr (DolganoNenets) Autonomous District 3 2 2 7 
Evenk Autonomous District 3 3 3 9 
Irkutsk region 5 4 1 10 
Ust Ordyn Buryat Autonomous District 4 2 2 8 
Kemerovo region 3 2 0 5 
Novosibirsk region 3 1 0 4 
Omsk region 3 0 0 3 
Tomsk region 3 0 0 3 
Chita region 4 2 0 6 
Aginsk Buryat Autonomous District 4 2 2 8 
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 3 1 0 4 
Primorie Territory 3 1 1 5 
Khabarovsk Territory 4 1 0 5 
Amur region 5 5 2 12 
Kamchatka region 4 2 0 6 
Koryak Autonomous District 3 2 1 6 
Magadan region 5 2 1 8 
Sakhalin region 3 2 1 6 
Jewish Autonomous District 2 0 0 2 
Chukotka Autonomous District 4 2 1 7 
     




DATA APPENDIX 3: UNIT ROOT TESTS FOR THE ENTRY RATE PANEL  
 
 
TABLE A3.1—UNIT ROOT TESTS FOR PANEL: P-VALUES 
      
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Region, Sector, Year (r,i,t)   Region, Sector, Year and Size 
(r,i,t,s) 
 Number of panels 4388, 13 years  Number of panels 9151, 13 years 
 Ho: Unit Root Ho: Unit Root  
( time trend) 
 Ho: Unit Root Ho: Unit Root 
(time trend) 
      
A) Levin-Lin-Chu 
test  
[0.000***] [0.000***]  [0.000***] [0.000***] 
      
B) Harris-
Tzavalis test 
[0.000***] [0.000***]  [0.000***] [0.000***] 
      
C) Breitung test [0.000***] [0.000***]  [0.000***] [0.000***] 
      
D) Fisher Test  
(ADF 3 lags) 
[0.000***] [0.000***]  [0.000***] [0.000***] 
      
Tests for unit roots in panel datasets: A) The Levin-Lin-Chu (2002); B) Harris-Tzavalis 
(1999); C) Breitung (2000; Breitung and Das 2005); D) Fisher-type (Choi 2001). The null 
hypothesis is that the panels contain a unit root: P-values in square brackets. All the tests reject 
the null hypothesis at 1% level for the region, sector and year panel “entry rates” series (columns 
1 and 2 –when controlling also for time trend-) as well as the region, sector, size and year “entry 
rates” series (columns 3 and 4, –when controlling also for time trend-). 
 
